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ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION.  SOME  PHILOSOPHICAL   
AND  CONSTITUTIONAL  QUESTIONS 
 
One may more and more clearly notice a division 
in contemporary philosophy and theory of law 
where the traditional anthropocentric model is con-
trasted with the eco-centric one. An important issue 
for the requirements of this paper is the reflection on 
the genesis and essence of both trends. It seems that 
only in this way it is possible to positively interpret 
the constitutional premises of issues connected with 
environmental protection and the problems resulting 
from it. The forthcoming short historical and phi-
losophical reflection constitutes not only an intro-
duction to further considerations but is also more 
significant, as the currently ongoing discussion con-
centrates on the pragmatic and instrumental aspect 
of environmental protection and does not suffi-
ciently stress the ethical dimension of the issue. The 
lack of a philosophical and historical analysis of the 
problem may be the reason for ambiguities, which 
cause most disputes that are apparent nowadays. Nu-
merous problems result from mixing the argu-
mentation of the anthropocentric and eco-centric mod-
els. 
It seems indisputable that for the Judeo-Christian 
culture circle, the paradigm of thinking is the an-
thropocentric model. The above thesis is justified in 
the context of the role played by the Biblical text of 
the Exodus and its influence on philosophical think-
ing of the culture circle in question. It points at man 
as a being formed to reflect God and ordered by the 
Creator to populate Earth and make it serve him∗. 
The great philosophers of Christianity as St. 
Augustine and St. Thomas of Aquinas spoke in this 
way. At present the Catholic Church conforms to 
this standpoint and the evidence for this may be the 
encyclicals Humanae vitae of Paul IV and Redemp-
tor hominis of John Paul II. Furthermore, the an-
thropocentric model of nature is also characteristic 
for contemporary ethics, and its essence is best ex-
pressed by the order formulated by I. Kant in the 
thesis that man is obliged to desist from cruelty to 
animals – as in this case – it is a duty that he has 
                                     
∗ The Exodus 1.28. 
with regard to himself. This extremely anthropo-
centric standpoint was also characteristic of Marxist 
philosophy, which especially in the fifties of the 20th 
century propagated ideas of unrestricted transfor-
mation in nature and the thesis that along with the 
development of productivity the dependency of so-
ciety on natural factors diminishes. 
In conclusion, one may state that from the anthro-
pocentric point of view, environmental protection is 
not treated as a target itself but as a means to reach the 
target of protecting man, his life, health, comfort or a 
possibility of ethical or aesthetic experience**. 
Things are different in the case of the eco-centric 
or in other words, the ecological model. The eco-
centric trend is quite a new one in philosophy and 
broadly understood ethics however one may rea-
sonably totle. Although Ulpian extended thargue 
that it is not too farfetched to search for its roots in 
the philosophy of the stoics, Socrates or Arise un-
derstanding of nature by adding the animal kingdom, 
the completely modern character is held by the 
views of equal rights of living creatures or in the 
laws of inanimate matter, which are so characteristic 
of ecology. Ecological movements dealing with 
links between nature and man, with particular atten-
tion paid to the outlook aspect, did not – as a matter 
of fact – work out a uniform programme***. The con-
sequence of this state is the lack of answer to the 
question, what is natural environment, what phe-
nomena should be protected and under what condi-
tions one may introduce their legal protection. It is 
a fact that the consumptive way of treating the world 
and the associated problems of industrial surplus and 
                                     
** See: W. Radecki “Ochrona środowiska naturalnego 
a ochrona dóbr osobistych” (the Protection of the natural 
environment and the protection of personal interests and 
belongings) in Dobra osobiste i ich ochrona w polskim 
prawie cywilnym (Personal interests and their protection 
in Polish civil law), Ossolineum 1986. 
*** A. Kaufmann: “Czy istnieją prawa natury” (Are 
there any laws of nature) translation J. Stelmach in Logos 
i Etos 1/1993, p. 24 and nn. 
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maximisation of unit profit at the expense of the 
whole ecosystem have placed contemporary society 
before the question of further existence. One has to 
think whether it is possible to solve the problem by 
referring to the universal laws of nature, governing 
the natural environment of living beings and them-
selves, what is postulated by ecologically oriented 
philosophy. It is rightly noticed, that the laws of na-
ture, which receive an empirical, descriptive sense 
may also have a normative dimension and by this 
constitute a basis to formulate directives for proper 
performance, both legal and moral∗. Although it is 
difficult to imagine axiologically neutral ecological 
ethics, one may easily imagine that contemporary 
philosophy stands before the problem of redefining 
the role of man and his relation with regard to na-
ture. In legal and natural concepts nature is rather 
a basis for legitimising the fact of being bound by 
law than the object of protection∗∗. Such a thesis 
immediately provokes a question on the status of na-
ture – that is whether nature is only an empirical phe-
nomenon, a moral one or may be it is a normative fact.  
If treating the issue of the natural environment or 
more broadly – nature according to axiological cate-
gories, one has to see it already on the level of gen-
eral typology of value. From this perspective the 
eco-cetric model, contrary to anthropocentric one, 
has to deal whith difficulties concerning relation 
between the value of nature and the value of human 
life. From this point of view the problem is crucial 
because either in the subjective and objective con-
cepts in ethics it may result with subordination of the 
value of human life to the value of nature, and more 
exactly to the value of nature environment. More 
over an extreme eco-centric approach excludes pos-
sibility of any workable definition of nature, because 
each definition a priori has to adopt the anthropocen-
tric point of view. It is so because each definition 
indirectly determines the scope of its objects. Thus 
from the pure eco-centric perspective the nature has 
to be an indefinable phenomenon, the essence of 
which weunderstend in an intuitive way.  
One does not need to adopt eco-centric approach 
to admit that the nature is a value and it is clear that 
in its characteristics – depending on the reference 
point – one may find hedonistic, vital, spiritual and 
religious aspects***. Should we follow the emotional 
                                     
∗ J. Stelmach and R. Sarkowicz: “Teoria prawa” (The-
ory of Law), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego, Krakow 1996, p. 185. 
∗∗ A. Kaufmann “Czy istnieją...” op. Cit. p. 27. 
*** W. Tatarkiewicz: “Historia Filozofii” (The history of 
Philosophy) PWN, Warsaw 1978, volume III p. 221. 
apriorism of Max Scheler and accept the objectivity 
of understanding values and their hierarchy, it will 
be easy to notice that also the value of the nature 
understood both, as a personal, social and all human 
value is a peculiar moral phenomenon. Such a thesis 
would additionally find justification if we included 
the existential dimension of the natural environment, 
determining the existence of man as well as his or-
namental dimension, i.e. determining the beauty of 
human life****. However only form anthropocentric 
point of view we can overcome the ambiguity of the 
concept of “ value” both in its subjective and objec-
tive understanding in the processes of creating and 
applying law. It is so because the concept of value in 
contemporary social sciences is nearly always de-
fined or described with reference to assessment or 
treated directly according to sociological catego-
ries*****. Without any concrete definition of nature 
environment it seems to be impossible to create in 
reality completely and axiologically coherent system 
of environmental protection in positive law.  
One can ask why we have to definite nature and 
thus limit in one way or another this phenomenon. 
Many of ecologists believe that value of nature or 
environment is universal thus commonly shared. If it 
is really so, there should be no 
terminological ambiguities. The historical devel-
opment of the natural law doctrine shows us some-
thing different. The dominant – in the Antiquity, the 
Middle Ages and the beginning of the contemporary 
era – substantial and non-historic expression of the 
law of nature, was gradually displaced by procedural 
understanding pertaining to rational criteria******. 
The practical consequence of the above stated prob-
lems is that eco-centric attitude is not adequate and 
useful to the legislators and lawyer. I would even 
argue that the positive law a priori presuppose an-
thropocentric model of nature. It seems that from the 
legal point of view, the only paradigm to be sus-
                                     
**** See J. Lipiec: “W przestrzeni wartości. Studia on-
tologii wartości” (In the dimension of value. Studies on 
the ontology of values), Harcerska Oficyna Wydawnicza, 
Krakow 1992, p. 29 and nn. 
***** More on this P. Winczorek: “Konstytucja i warto-
ści” (The constitution and values) in “Charakterystyka 
і struktura norm konstytucji” (The characteristics and 
structure of constitutional norms), Wydawnictwo Se-
jmowe, Warsaw 1997, p. 44 and nn. The issue of theory of 
value was described more profoundly in the paper of G. 
Klos in “Pojęcia, teorie i badania wartości w naukach 
społecznych” (The Concepts, theories and research of values 
in social sciences), PWN, Warsaw 1982. 
****** A. Kaufmann “Czy istnieją...” op. cit., p. 27. 
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tained is the anthropocentric attitude to the natural 
environment. Therefore, the praxeological, eco-
nomic and political issues connected with the matter 
of nature environment will still be more important 
for organs creating and applying  
Only from anthropocentric point of view the con-
cept of nature and thus the natural environment may 
gain a purely projective, dogmatic character of a 
very empirical overtone. In this way, the legal pro-
tection will apply to this fragment of nature – under-
stood in any way – as defined by the legislator. 
Moreover when analysing the problem of natural 
environment from such a perspective we do not ex-
clude the question whether and how should its value 
be protected. 
 
ANVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER 
 
As it has already been stated, the value of the 
natural environment has a personal, social and hu-
man dimension. It seems justified to ask the question 
on a possibility of constructing man’s right to the 
natural environment. The issue is very current in-
deed as the right to the environment is the object of a 
growing number of international declarations and 
pacts such as the Declaration of Basic Rights and 
Freedom of the European Parliament dated 12th 
April 1989 or the 11th Additional Protocol pertaining 
to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the 
American Convention of Human Rights in San Sal-
vador. Man’s right to the natural environment does 
not need to have the status of a new spontaneous law 
of the 3rd generation of human rights but on the con-
trary, one may argument, that this right results di-
rectly from the regulations of positive law guar-
anteeing the right to life and privacy∗. It is important 
to stress, that the construction of man’s right to the 
natural environment is an expression of accepting 
the anthropocentric point of view itself. Without go-
ing into the details of accepting this concept in inter-
national law, it is worth noticing that the issue of 
man’s right to the environment may be constructed 
both on a constitutional level and that of standard 
legislation. 
Theoretically, the constitutional “rationing” of 
right to the environment may have three forms. First, 
the constitution may proclaim it directly. Second, the 
constitution may recognise the regulations aimed at 
protecting the environment as a guarantee of differ-
                                     
∗ J. Menkes “Prawo do środowiska jako prawo czło-
wieka” (The right to the environment as the right of man) 
in “Ekologia i prawo” TBKUL, Lublin 1999 p. 44. 
ent rights, e.g. the right to live or to health care pro-
tection. The third possibility is a situation where al-
though the constitution does neither proclaim the 
right to the environment directly nor indirectly, the 
doctrine tries to derive them from other constitu-
tional rights∗∗. In such a situation one has to ask the 
question on the role to be played by consti-
tutionalisation of the right to the natural environ-
ment, particularly about its target, especially that the 
formulation of the right to the environment in the 
constitution does not determine whether and in what 
way it will be asserted∗∗∗.  
However, the literature correctly states that the 
constitution may be treated not only as an element of 
the legal system. The constitution fulfils a number of 
political system functions as shown best in theories 
of the social contract, indicating principles accepted 
by all rational and reasonable people. Should we 
simplify things and accept that in a democratic state 
the constitution fulfils the function of a social contract, 
apart from the stabilising one consisting in defining a 
legally binding vision of a state, and dynamic one re-
lated to determination of its targels****.  
From the theoretical and legal point of view, ac-
cepting the dynamic role of the constitution brings 
about certain difficulties in defining its normative 
status as a source of law. Therefore, in order for the 
value of the natural environment to be able to take 
advantage of constitutional protection, it is necessary 
to keep a balance between the normative and pro-
gramme elements. Should the issue of the natural 
environment be depicted in the constitution only 
through programme norms, then on the basis of the 
positivistic concept of law, it will be difficult to con-
struct a right of man to the environment. It is so be-
cause. The constitutional protection of the natural 
environment is directly connected with the problem 
of the normative status of its regulations. 
The doctrine includes a standpoint, that each ele-
ment of the constitution is normative in character as 
                                     
∗∗ W. Radecki: “Ochrona środowiska naturalnego 
a ochrona dóbr osobistych” (the Protection of the natural 
environment and the protection of personal interests and 
belongings) p. 237. 
∗∗∗ W. Radecki: “Ochrona środowiska naturalnego 
a ochrona dóbr osobistych” (the Protection of the natural 
environment and the protection of personal interests and 
belongings) p.238 
**** A. Bałaban: “Funkcje konstytucji” (The functions 
of the Constitution) in “Charakterystyka i struktura norm 
konstytucji” (The Characteristics and structure of Constitu-
tion norms), Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warsaw 1997, p. 9. 
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as it has been intentionally placed and accepted as 
part of a special procedure. The problem with such 
a depiction is connected with the claim that the nor-
mative character can be held only by language state-
ments, and that includes constitutional regulations, 
which state certain obligations for the entities apply-
ing them*. In other words, the problem is answering 
the question whether the whole text of the 
constitution contains procedural norms or whether 
some of its parts are only programme-like**. The 
stated or a different settlement of the above issue 
will determine the possibility of formulating – 
through interpretation – the legal norms on the basis 
of regulations being programme or declarative in 
character. Declining the constitution’s programme 
entries, their normative character brings about seri-
ous consequences for the legislative process. In such 
a case the legislator would not be bound in any way 
by an entry in the constitution and the environmental 
protection would exclusively depend on current 
preferences. However, it seems that although pro-
gramme-like regulations do not directly determine 
defined models of procedure, their presence in con-
stitution texts cannot be interpreted only as as-
certainment of a certain political fact, which may be 
observed within a longer time span***. The role of 
programme norms is rather directed at obliging leg-
islative organs to keep to certain defined values in 
the processes of defining the directions of socio-
economic development. However, in the case of 
programme norms, defining what behaviour is re-
quired and what is forbidden by a programme norm 
not only requires a complex argumentation but also 
referring to certain elements beyond a legal text, i.e. 
causal relations recognised on the basis of empirical 
knowledge****. The contents of a norm would be de-
                                     
* B. Banaszak “Proceduralne i materialnoprawne normy 
konstytyucji” (Procedural and material-legal norms of the 
Constitution” in “Charakterystyka i struktura norm kon-
stytucji” (The Characteristics and structure of Constitu-
tion norms), Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warsaw 1997, p. 
120. 
** See A. Kubiak: “O interpretacji przepisów pro-
gramowych Konstytucji” (On the interpretation of pro-
gramme regulations of the Constitution) in “Państwo i 
Prawo” (The State and Law) 1987, No 4, p. 20. 
*** A. Kubiak: “O interpretacji...” op. Cit. p. 24 and nn. 
 
**** See T. Gizbert-Studnicki & A. Grabowski: “Normy 
programowe w konstytucji” (Programme norms in the 
constitution” in “Charakterystyka i struktura norm kon-
stytucji” (The Characteristics and structure of Constitu-
tion norms), Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warsaw 1997, p. 
95. 
fined – amongst others – by applying the rules of an 
instrumental order or prohibition*****. The problem 
consists in the fact that such proposals are not logi-
cally justified. Each justification of norms has to 
refer to the principle of legislator’s rationality. 
Therefore, it is necessary to accept a priori that pro-
gramme norms on a legislative level are to indicate 
a content related way of legislative activity, while in 
the process of applying law, they are to indicate the 
way of its interpretation. In the first case, the pro-
jective character of programme norms renders im-
possible the assessment of consistency of the ac-
cepted laws with the constitution. The only criterion 
would be the subjective and changing in time crite-
rion of target implementation. In the latter case one 
should agree, that certain legal principles result from 
programme norms and accept the resulting difficulty 
in settling the target discrepancy of these norms. 
An illustration of the above-discussed problems 
may be the example of regulating environmental 
protection in the Constitution of the Republic of Po-
land from 1997. In line with art. 5 “The Republic of 
Poland ensures protection of the environment, by 
keeping to the principle of balanced development”. 
The norm of art. 5 is more specific in form of art. 74 
stating that public authorities run a policy ensuring 
ecological security to contemporary and future gen-
erations and obliges public authorities to protect the 
environment. Also the norm of art. 86 states that 
“Each person is obliged to care for the condition of 
the environment and is to be responsible for bringing 
about its degradation”. 
A deeper reflection on the editorial structure of 
the above stated regulations leads to a clear conclu-
sion on their anthropocentric character. The contents 
of the above articles of the Constitution of the Re-
public of Poland constitute a declaration of accept-
ing values of the natural environment. At the same 
time they relativise the degree of protection to the 
requirements of balanced development. The contents 
of art. 74 not only rule out the subjective inter-
pretation of natural environment, with its idea of 
equal treatment of living creatures, but are also 
a manifestation of treating environmental protection 
instrumentally. What is more, by analysing the regu-
lations above, it is easy to notice that the legal norms 
resulting from them, understood here as statements – 
in accordance with given language principles – or-
dering or forbidding certain behaviours to some enti-
                                     
***** See: Z. Ziembiński: “Metodologiczne zagadnienia 
prawoznawstwa” (Methodological issues of law studies”, 
Warsaw 1974, p. 154. 
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ties, do not have the character of fundamental norms. 
Fundamental norms show certain behaviour as some 
duty regardless of the target which the given behav-
iour is to serve. What is more, such norms are not 
norms of purposefulness as such norms of required 
behaviour are designated as a means for achieving a 
certain goal by the addressee of the norm and not by 
the norm creator. Therefore, it seems that the prob-
lem of environmental protection is regulated in the 
Constitution nearly exclusively by means of pro-
gramme norms. This is most clearly seen on the ex-
ample of the norm of art. 5 which does not show its 
addressee how he or she should behave in order to 
reach some target but shows what goal is to be 
achieved. Of primary importance is settling whether 
the norm of art. 5 is firm in character, i.e. it contains 
a strict requirement of given behaviour or whether it 
is not firm, i.e. makes certain behaviour dependant 
on the will of the addressee. It is commonly accepted 
on the basis of semantic and pragmatic analyses, that 
the normative statements belonging to law are firm 
in character, so it is the will of the issuer of a direc-
tive that determines the addressee’s required behav-
iour∗. However, assuming that the programme norms 
have the character of principles, the inability to fully 
implement the targets indicated by them and the pos-
sible discrepancy between targets indicated by dif-
ferent programme norms, does not deprive them of 
their binding force. In many cases rejecting this prin-
ciple would cause – that in an instance of a dis-
crepancy of the value of environmental protection 
with another value – the norm of art. 5 would not 
have binding force. Therefore, regulating environ-
mental protection by means of programme norms 
does not guarantee full freedom of the legislator in 
defining its scope. The freedom of the legislator in 
this area is limited by the order to implement legis-
lation of certain development contents. That is an 
order that each subsequent law implements certain 
constitutional principles to a greater extent than the 
previous one∗∗. One may assume that from art. 5 an 
order results – both on a legislative level as well as 
in the process of applying law – to choose such so-
lutions that are aimed at implementing the target of 
environmental protection, which at the same time 
hamper the socio-economic development to the 
smallest extent. On the basis of art. 5, in line with 
the principle of an instrumental order, one should 
carry out the deduction that “if the Republic of Po-
land ensures environmental protection, that means 
                                     
∗ T. Studnicki & A. Grabowski “Normy...” op. cit, s. 
106 and nn. 
∗∗ A. Kubiak “O interpretacji...” op. cit. p. 26. 
that state organs should do everything that is neces-
sary to implement this task and not disturb the bal-
anced development”. By appropriately applying the 
rule of instrumental prohibition, one may construct 
a directive, “if the Republic of Poland ensures envi-
ronmental protection, that means that state organs 
are forbidden do anything that would render impos-
sible the implementation of the task of environmental 
protection and what is not justified by the principle of 
balanced development”. Furthermore, it seems justi-
fied to accept – in the process of applying the norms of 
art. 5 – the principle that the higher the level of violat-
ing the task of environmental protection is, the more 
important must be the implementation of the task con-
nected with balanced development***. 
The above considerations show that it is impos-
sible to define in abstracto the hierarchy of pro-
gramme norm goals. Generally speaking, it is neces-
sary to accept that the hierarchical relations of the 
norms of the constitution’s programme targets 
should be researched in concreto and every time it is 
necessary to decide, the implementation of which is 
more important in a given situation. 
As far as this study is concerned, it is also im-
portant to stress the educational role of consitution-
alisation of the issue of the natural environment pro-
tection. This function becomes most fully apparent 
in art. 86 of the Constitution of the Republic of Po-
land, which obliges all people to care for the con-
dition of the environment by showing that everyone 
is responsible for bringing about its deterioration. 
Although this paper does not seem to create any new 
basis of legal responsibility for ecological dam-
age****, it constitutes a confirmation of the principle 
of solidarity within the scope of environmental pro-
tection. The proper sense of art. 86 may be read in 
the context of principles, which establish the right to 
information on the condition and protection of the 
environment as well as the order to support the ac-
tivities of the citizens by public authorities – aimed 
at protecting and enhancing the condition of the en-
vironment (Art. 74 item 3,4). It seems that the mes-
sage of these regulations is to stress the value of the 
natural environment and an appeal to all people to 
use its resources consciously. These regulations 
seem to illustrate the Kantian thesis that environ-
mental protection is an order of human reason. 
                                     
*** See T. Studnicki & A. Gabowski “Normy...” op. cit. 
p. 109. 
**** J. Menkes “Prawo do...” op. cit. p. 21. 
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В. Цируль 
 
ЗАЩИТА  ОКРУЖАЮЩЕЙ  СРЕДЫ.  НЕКОТОРЫЕ 
ФИЛОСОФСКИЕ  И  КОНСТИТУЦИОННЫЕ  ВОПРОСЫ 
 
Данная статья посвящена основным проблемам защиты окружающей среды. Первая проблема свя-
занна с вопросом возможности принятия в позитивном праве экоцентричной модели защиты ок-
ружающей среды. В связи с этим целью настоящей статьи является краткое представление дискуссии 
между экоцентричной и антропоцентричной моделями защиты окружающей среды. На основании 
результатов данной дискуссии будет доказано, что экоцентричная модель неприменима в позитивном 
праве. Следовательно вторая часть аргументации связана с защитой окружающей среды в качестве 
вопроса конституционного права. Особое внимание уделяется проблемам, имеющим отношение к ре-
гулированию конституционной защиты с помощью программных норм. Я буду доказывать, что этот 
вид регулирования, принимая во внимание защиту окружающей среды, возлагает некоторые обязан-
ности на законодателя и правоприменительные органы власти. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION.  SOME  PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND  CONSTITUTIONAL  QUESTIONS 
 
This article deals mainly with basic problems concerning environmental protection. The first one relates 
to the question whether it is possible to adopt positive law of an eco-centric model of environmental 
protection. In this respect the aim of this article is to present briefly the discussion between eco-centric and 
anthropocentric models concerning the environmental protection. On this ground it will be argued that the 
eco-centric model is not applicable within positive law. The second part of the argumentation is related to the 
environmental protection as a constitutional matter. The text focuses especially on problems related to 
regulation of the constitutional protection through programme norms. I will argue that this kind of regulation 
with respect to the environmental protection put some duties on the legislator and law applying authorities.
